The State of Utah v. Alfred William Johnson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1980
The State of Utah v. Alfred William Johnson : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.G. Fred Metos; Attorney for Defendant-AppellantRobert B.
Hansen ; Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Johnson, No. 16668 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1962
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ALFRED WILLIAM JOHNSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16668 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty of Burglary 
in the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding. 
ROBERT HAl.~SEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
G. FRED METOS .. 
Salt Lake Legal De~) ~$OC. 
333 South Seconcl ... t '\;; 
Salt Lake City, Ute ·~· Attorney for Defen4aat · .• · llan 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ALFRED WILLIAM JOHNSON, Case No. 16668 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a jury verdict of guilty of Burglary 
in the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, presiding. 
ROBERT HAN SEN 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Office Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
G. FRED METOS 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellan 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATE1E~IT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
1 
1 
2 
DTSPOSITION Ii:l TH.!:: LOWER COURT 
RELI£F SOUGHT ON APPEH 
STATE~NT OF THE FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR BY EXCLUDING THE APPELLANT' S 
HEARSAY STATEMENTS WHICH QUALIFIED 
UNDER AT LEAST FIVE OF THE' EXCEPTIONS 
TO THE HE~RSAY RULE . . . . . . . . 4 
POVT A: THE TRIP.L COURT COMMITTED ERROR 
BY EXCLUDING THE APPELLJ.NT' S 
STATE~T AS IT CONSTITUTED 
A STATEMEi'l'T OF THE MENTAL 
COND.LTION OF THE DECLAR.Ai.\JT 5 
POINT B: THE TRlAL COURT COM!'iITTED 
ERROR BY F:XCLUDING THE APPEL-
LA.'l"T' S HEARSAY STATEMEN"i' AS 
IT CONSTITITTED A CONFESSION 
OR ADMISSION . . . . . . . . . 8 
POINT C: THE TRIAL COURT C0'1MITTED 
ERROR BY EXCLUDING THE APPEL-
LANT ''S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT 
CONSTITUTED P.N ADMISSION BY A 
PARTY . . . . . . . . . . 11 
POINT D: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
ERROR BY EXCLUDING TBE 
APPELLA.'l"T' S HEARSAY STATEMENT 
AS IT CONSTITGTED A DECLAR-
ATION AGAWST INTEREST . . . . 12 
POINTE· THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
ERROR BY EXCLUDING THE APPEL-
LANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT 
WAS A CONTEMPORANEOUS STATJ:;.""!ENT. 15 
POINT F: THE ERROR Ii'~ EXCLUDING THE 
APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT 
WAS PREJUDICIAL EECAUSE THERE 
IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY 
THF..T THE VERDICT WOULD HF..VE BEEN 
DTFFERENT HAD THE EVIDENCE BEEN 
ADMITTED . . . . . . . . . . · 18 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II: CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF THE CRIME 
OF BURGLARY AND THE FAILURE OF 
THE COURT TO SO INSTRUCT WHEN 
REQUESTED BY APPELLA:.'lT WAS 
REVEFSIBLE ERROR . . . . . . . 
CONCLUSION 
POINT A: THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL 
CASE HAS A RIGHT TO SUBMIT HIS 
THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY 
IN THE INSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . 
POINT B: CRI~1INAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER 
AND INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY 
POINT C : WHEN MUST THE TRIAL COURT 
INSTRUCT THE JURY ON LESSER 
I~lCLUDED OFFENSE 
CASES CITED 
Beck v. Alabama, U.S. 65 LEd 2d 392 (1980) 
Commonwealth v. Carter 344 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1975) 
Crawford v. State 241 N.E. 2d 795 (Indiana 1968) 
Day v. State, 532 S.W. 2d 302 (Tex. 1976) . 
PAGE 
19 
21 
2] 
29 
37 
23 
29 
34 
27 
Johnston v. Oh ls 76 Wash. 2d 398, 457 P. 2d 194 (1969) 16 
Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966) . . . 32 
PeoEle v. Battle, 22 H.Y. 2d 323, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 661, 239, N.E. 2d 535 
PeoEle v. Henderson, 41 N.Y. 2d 233, 359 N.E. 2d U57 (1976) 
PeoEle v. Robinson, 6 u. 101, 21 P.4D3 (1889) . 
PeoEle v. Terry, 43 A.D. 2d 875, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 184 
State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937) 
State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977) 
State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978) 
ii 
28 
28 
30 
28 
30 
2L 
30 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Burr, 579 P.2d 331 (Utah 1978) 
State v. Coffin, 565 P.2d 391 (Ore. 1977) 
State v. Cornish, 568 P.2d 360 (Utah 1977) 
State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976) 
State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977) 
State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P.55 (1929) 
State v. Fertig, 120 U. 224, 233 P.2d 347 (1951) 
State v. Gee, 28 U.2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (1972) 
State v. Gellaty, 22 U.2d 149, 449 P.2d 993 (1969) 
State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970) 
State v. Gleason, 17 U.2d 149, 405 P.2d 793 (1965) 
State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, (Utah 1977) 
State v. Hendricks, 596 P. 2d 633 (Utah 1979) 
State v. Hymas, 64 U. 285, 230 P.349 (1924) 
State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 646, 500 P.2d 747 (Haw. 1972). 
State v. Lloyd, 568 P. 2d 357 (Utah 1977) 
State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978) 
State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955) 
State v. Mitcheson, 560 P. 2d 1120 (Utah 1977) 
State v. Mora 558 P.2d 1335, (Utah 1977) 
State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, (Utah 1977) 
State v. Roberts 612 P. 2d 360 (Utah 1980) 
State v. Rood 462 P. 2d 299 (Ariz. 1969) 
State v. Sanders 27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972) 
State v. Simmons , 573 P. 2d 341 (Utah 1977) 
State v. Stenback, 78 U. 350 2 P. 2d 1050 (1931) 
iii 
PAGE 
9' 11, 12 
29 
23 
32,33 
21 
23 
35 
35 
22 
21,22,31 
21 
35 
26,33 
31 
35.36 
23 
16,17 
22 
21, 36 
22 
33 
15 
35,36 
10' 13' 16. 17 
5,6,18 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Su·nter, 550 p. 2d 184 (Utah 1977) 
State v. Valdez, 19 u. 2d 426, 432 P.2d 53 (1967) 
State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977) 
State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23. 33 P.2d 640 (1934) 
State in K.D.S. I 578 P.2d 9 (Utah 1978) 
Watters v. 0uerry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 19 78) 
STATE STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2) (a) (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-204 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 et. seq. (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-33-6 (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402 ( 4) 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Hearsay Handbook, Binder (1975) .. 
McCormick on Evidence, 2nd Edition (1977) 
Rule 63(12)(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 63 (6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 63 (7) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 63 (10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 62 (7) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 63(4)(b) of the Uta.h Rules of Evidence 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
iv 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Other Authorities Cited Continued 
R11 les of Practice in the District Courts, Rule 5, 4 
Texas Penal Code . 
Utah Criminal Code Outline (1973) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51 
v 
PAGE 
21 
27 
27 
21 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ALFRED WILLIAM JOHNSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16668 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE r-TATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Alfred William Johnson, appeals from a 
conviction and judgment of Burglary, a felony of the second 
degree, in the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, 
presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Alfred William Johnson, was charged 
with Burglary, a felony of the second degree in violation 
of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 202, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, he was convicted as charged in a jury trial and was 
sentenced to incarceration at the Utah State Prison for the 
indeterminate term as provided by law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction and judgment 
rendered below and to have the case remanded to the Third Judicial 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At trial the victim of the offense, Mr. Ball, 
testified that on returning one afternoon to his apartment 
located at Snowbird Ski Resort he found the appellant inside 
(T. 11). The appellant, according to Mr. Ball, was standing or 
crouching between the ouside glass doors and the bed (T. 11-12). 
This witness also testified that to the best of his recollecti~ 
the apartment had been locked and secured when he left several 
hours before and that an outside screen, now torn or cut, pre-
vious ly had been intact (T. 12, 17, 24). Mr. Bal 1 stated that 
his apartment was one of a number located in a section reserved 
for employees of Snowbird and that all of the other apartments wer: 
vacant, open and obviously undergoing remodeling (T.20-30). Afte: 
confronting the appellant, who expressed surprise and stated he 
was looking for a way out of the building, Mr. Ball suggested 
that they contact the manager of the apartment complex (T. 12-14, 
25-26). The appellant, still inquiring as to the way out, left t~' 
· d d · t th · t s "J" egged" to a car and premises an , accor ing o e wi nes , 
drove away. (T. 14,27-28). Mr. Ball testified that nothing was t2 
from his apartment but some of his personal effects had been dis· 
turbed (T. 11, 18-19). 
The state then called the arresting officer who testifiec 
d h 11 t a matter of on direct examination that he steppe t e appe an 
minutes after Mr. Ball had seen the appellant drive away (T. 36 
-2-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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On cross-examination defense counsel attempted to elicit a 
statement from the officer made by the appellant at the time of 
the stop (T. 38,30). The trial judge refused to allow the 
officer to testify about the content of this statement on the basis 
that it was hearsay, and that it was self serving and did not 
qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule (T. 29,41-45). 
The judge indicated, however, that he would allow the officer 
to answer if the questions were asked by the prosecutor (T. 
43,45). The court also stated that if the defense wanted 
the statement to come in then the appellant would have to 
forego his constitutional privilege not to testify (T. 41,45). 
Defense counsel then made a timely proffer of the expected 
testimony, stipulating that the statements were voluntary and 
constituted an admission by ~he appellant to criminal activity 
(1. 41,45,49-50). Defense counsel further indicated that the 
appellant who had several prior burglary convictions which the 
court refused to exclude, could take the stand if the corrobor-
ative testimony of the arresting officer was allowed (T. 49-51). 
At the close of the trial, defense counsel requested that an 
instruction of the lesser included offense of Criminal Trespass 
be given to the jury. This request was denied and an exception 
was taken (T. 75). 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
~HE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY 
EXCLUDING THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENTS 
WHICH QUALIFIED UNDER AT LEAST FIVE OF THE 
EX.CE PT IONS TO THE HEARSAY RULE. 
During the cross examination of the arresting police 
officer, defense counsel attempted to elicit a statement that 
the appellant had made at the time of his arrest (T.39). The 
substance of the statement that was attempted to be elicited 
was an admission by the appellant that he had been in the room 
at Snowbird, but lacked the requisite intent to connnit the burglar; 
with which he was charged (T.41). That trial court ruled 
that the statement was hearsay and did not fit within any of the 
exceptions to Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence (T. 45). The 
primary basis stated by the court for the ruling was that the 
statement was self-serving (T.45). 
The trial court was correct in ruling that the statement 
was hearsay, as described in Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
This is because it was a statement made by a person other than the 
witness and it was being offered to prove the truth of the matter 
stated. However, the trial court committed error by excluding the 
statement as it fit within at least five of the exceptions to the 
hearsay rule. These five exceptions include: Rule 63 (12)(a), 
statement of Physical or Mental Condition of the Dec larant; Rule 
63(6) Confessions and Admissions; Rule 63(7) Admissions by Parties 
d Rule 63 ( 4 ) Cb) contemc Rule 63(10) DeclaratimsAgainst Interest; an 
- Li-
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aneous Statements. 
POINT A 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY EXCLUDING 
THE APPELLANT'S STATEMENT AS IT CONSTITUTED 
A STATEMENT OF THE MENTAL CO::;/DITION OF 
THE DE CLARAJ.\IT . 
The appellant was initially seen by Officer 
Church proceeding westbound on 9400 South Street in Salt Lake 
County, a street leading directly to the Snowbird Resort 
(T. 38). The defendant was then stopped and subsequently 
made an admission that he was at Snowbird but the court would 
not allow the officer to testify about what the appellant 
said his reason was for being at the resort. 
Such statements were admissible as a statement of a 
mental condition of the declarant as described in Rule 63(12) (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That exception to the hearsay 
rule states, 
Unless the judge finds it was made in bad 
faith, a statement of the declarant's (a) 
then existing state of mind, emotion or physical 
sensation, inclduing statements of intent, plan, 
motive, design, mental feeling, pain and bodily 
health, but not including memory or belief to 
prove the fact remembered or believed, when such 
a mental or physical condition is in issue or 
is relevant to prove or explain acts or conduct 
of the declarant. 
In State v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341 (Utah, 1977) this court was 
confronted with the same issue as is raised here. In that case 
the defendant took a car from an automobile dealer with the 
dealer's permission; however, when he did not return the car 
-5-
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that night he was charged with auto theft. Several hours after 
receiving the car the defendant had made a statement to a friend 
that he had the car for a test drive. The trial court sustained 
the prosecutor's hearsay objection to this evidence and this court 
held that the trial court committed error as the statement 
was admissible as a statement of the declarant's state of mind. 
The court found that the error was not prejudicial. The other 
Utah Case which specifically addressed the use of Rule 63(12) 
(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence is State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 
1377 (Utah 1977). In that case the court held that it was error 
to admit statements of the victim of a homicide expressing her 
fear of the defendant. The court ruled that the statements 
lacked probative value as they were made several days prior to the 
homicide and they did not tend to prove a fact in issue. 
In the case at bar the statement was made minutes after tbe 
appellant had been seen in ~1r. Ball's room at the Snowbird resort. 
Such a statement was made even closer in time to the event in 
question than those held to be error to exclude in State v. 
SitmD.ons, supra. The statement more accurately reflects the state 
of mind of the declarant than the statement in Simmons because 
in Simmons the declarant' s intent to keep the car could change, 
thus resulting in the theft, where here the important question is 
the intent while the appellant was in the room. Likewise with re: 
to time and relevancy, the appellant's statement is clearly 
distinguishable from the statements held to be inadmissible in 
State v. Wauneka, supra. 
-6-
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With respect to the nature of the statement, t'.le proffer was 
that the appellant had stated that he was not in the room to 
commit a theft (T. 45,49). Clearly this is a description of 
his state of mind, intent, plan, motive or design as specified 
in Rule 63(12) (6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The cha.rge of 
Burglary as described in the Information in this case required 
the state to prove that the appellant had the intent to commit 
a theft. Consequently, the substance of the statement was 
probative of a material fact in issue, thus distinguishing this 
case from the statement admitted in the Wauneka case. 
The trial court ruled that the appellant's statement was 
inadmissible because it was self-serving. Although that may 
be true to some extent, that is not the test for admissibility 
under Rule 63(12)(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The only 
question under that exception to the hearsay rule is whether the 
statement was made in bad faith. The trial court did not make 
any such finding, but instead equated defense counsel's attempt 
to elicit the statement to being self-serving (T.45). 
There was no showing that the statement in question was made 
in bad faith. It would be probative of the intent element of the 
offense of burglary ~ the only element at issue in the trial. 
Finally, it was an expression of the appellant's mental condition. 
Consequently, it was admissible as a statement of the declarant' s 
mental condition, an exception to the hearsay rule and the trial 
court committed error in excluding it. 
- 7-
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POINT B 
THE TRIAL COURT Cm1MITTED ERRO~ BY EXCLUDUTG 
THE APPELLA..~T' S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT CON -
STITUTED A CONFESSION OR ADMISSION. 
The circi.nnstances surrounding the making of the statement 
in question previously have been described and need not be repeated 
here. In this statement the appellant admitted that he was in 
a place where he should not have been. Such an act could have 
constituted a Criminal Trespass in violation of Utah Code Ann. !76· 
(1953 as amended), which is a lesser and included offense to 
Burglary which was charged in the Information (See Point II, infra 
Such a hearsay statement is admissible as an admission or 
confession, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. This 
exception is described in Rule 63(6) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence: 
In a criminal proceeding as against the accused, 
a previous statement by him relative to the offense 
charged if, and only if, the judge finds that the 
statement was made knowingly and voluntarily by 
the accused and the circumstances under which the 
statement was made were not violative of the 
constitutional rights of the accused; 
The type of declarations covered by this exception to the 
hearsay rule are readily observable from a brief overview of the 
interpretive case law. 
In State in re I<DS., 578 P.2d 9 (Utah, 1978), the juvenile 
defendant was charged with Driving Under the Influence after he 
was involved in an automobile accident with a friend. He stated 
to the arresting police officer that he was driving the automobile 
but he was not under the influence of alcohol. That statement was 
held to be an admission even though it was partially exculpatory 
-8-
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Similarly, in State v. Burr, 579 P2d 331 (Utah, 1978), the 
defendant went to a Salt Lake City Police Officer and told him 
that he would be willing to testify against others involved in , 
the Second Degree Felony Thefts with which he was charged if the 
state would drop these charges to Class A Misdemeanors. This 
court held that such a statement constituted an admission as 
described in Rule 63(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
As can be seen, the statements admissible under Rule 63(6) 
01 the Utah Rules of Evidence need not be full admissions or 
confession to the offense charged, but may be partially exculpatory. 
The statement in question here is much more exculpatory than that 
given in State v. Burr, supra. This is because in Burr the defend-
ant told police he was willing to make a deal, here the appel-
lant admitted to his participation in a criminal offense. The 
statement here is identical in nature to the statement given in 
State in re K.D.S., supra. The statement in that case involved 
an admission by the defendant to being the driver of a car involved 
in an automobile accident, but he denied being intoxicated. Here 
the appellant admitted to being present in a place where he should 
not have been, but denied having the intent to commit .the crime of 
theft while in the room. 
With this in mind, the question of the meaning of the phrase 
"as against the accused" must be addressed. The trial court in 
this case ruled that the phrase meant that the defendant could not 
introduce the evidence of an admission or confession, but the state 
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could do so if it desired (T. 40-45). Such a ruling is incon-
sistent with policies underlying the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule. It is generally recognized that hearsay evidence is 
inadmissible because it lacks the factors which have tradition-
ally been found to insure reliability found in other types of 
evidence. McCormick on Evidence 2nd Edition (1977) §245. 
Certain types of hearsay evidence are admissible because these 
declarations are made under circumstances or because their 
contents reflect strong indicia of reliability. Binder, The 
Hearsav Handbook, (1975) at p.35. Consequently, it is the 
indicia of reliability, not the nature of the party that can 
introduce the evidence, that is reflcted in the phrase "as against 
the accused" in Rule 63 (6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The 
phrase "as against the accused" must be interpreted to mean that 
the statement would subject the declarant to some form of 
criminal responsibility, "because experience teaches that it is 
unlikely that he would so declareunless it were true" State v. 
Sanders, 27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972). Another reason for 
adopting this interpretation is that to give Rule 63(6) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence the interpretation that the trial court 
thought appropriate - only the state could introduce the 
evidence - would require th2.t Rule 63 (7), of the l!tah P.ules 
of Evidence which begins "As against himself a statement by a 
person who is a party to the action ... ", could not be applied by 
a party opponent to introduce evidence against the opposing 
party. Such an interpretation of Rule 63 (7) of the Utah Rules of 
-10-
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Evidence is not reflected in the case law interpreting that 
rule. State in re KDS, supra, State v. Burr, supra. 
As previously described the statement in question here 
was at least as inculpatory as that in State in re KDS, 
supra. This meets the first criterion of admissibility, that the 
statement be "against the accused". As for the other requirements 
there is no question that the statement was relative to the offense 
charged and counsel stipulated that the declaration was given 
knowingly and voluntarily under circumstances not violative of 
the appellant's constitutional rights (T.49). Consequently, the 
hearsay statement was admissible as an admission or confession 
which is exception to the hearsay rule as described in Rule 63(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence and the court committed error by 
excluding it. 
POINT C 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY EXCLUDING 
THE APPELLAl~T' S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT CON-
STITUTED AN ADMISSION BY A PARTY. 
The statement by the appellant that he was in ~1r. Ball's 
room but did not intend to commit a criminal offense was admissible 
as an admission by a party. This exception tc the hearsay rule 
is described in Rule 63(7) of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
As against himself a statement by a person who is 
a party to the action in his individual or a rep-
resentative capacity and, if the lat~er! who ~as 
acting in such representative capactiy in making 
the statement. 
The hearsay declarations which this exception covers are essentially 
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the same as those covered by Rule 63 (6). In fact this court held 
that both Rules 63(6) and 63(7) of the Utah Rules of Eviden~e 
were applicable in State v. Burr, supra, and in State in re KDS, 
supra. Those cases were both described in Point B, supra, and 
need not be discussed further here. In Watters v. Querry, 
588 P.2d 702 (Utah, 1978), the court held that it was improper 
to preclude the plaintiff in a civil case from eliciting from 
a witness that one of the co-defendant's stated she was dis-
tressed because she felt like she was the cause of the accident 
which was eventually the subject of that civil law suit. 
All of these statements express either an admission of 
liability in a civil case or are inculpatory in a criminal 
case. As has previously been discussed, the statements made by 
the appellant in this case admit some criminal responsibility; 
therefore, the statement is "as against himself" as required by 
the rule. Likewise, there is no question that the appellant is 
a party to the criminal action. The hearsay statement in this 
case qualifies as an exception to the general hearsay rule and 
the trial court erred in not admitting it into evidence. 
POINT D 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ER..~OR BY EXCLUDING 
THE APPELLAi."IT' S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT CON-
STITUTED A DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST. 
The appellant's hearsay statement qualifies as an exception 
to the hearsay rule because it was a declaration against interest 
This exception is described in Rule 63 (10) of the Utah Rules of 
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Evidence which provides in part: 
(10) Declarations Against Interest. Subject to the 
limitations of exception (6), a statement which 
the judge finds was made by a declarant who is 
unavailable as a witness and which was at the 
time of the assertion so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest 
or so far subjected him to civil or criminal 
liability ... that under the circumstances existing 
would not have made the statement unless he believed it 
to be true. 
This rule was applied in State v. Sanders, supra. In that 
case the defendant was charged with a robbery in which four 
indi.viduals were involved, his defense was that persons other 
than himself had committed the robbery. One of the four per-
sons that the defendant blamed for the robbery made a statement 
to an attorney that he and three others, who did not include the 
defendant committed the robbery. The declarant refused to 
testify and the evidence was offered as a declaration against 
interest. It was argued that the basis for the statement being 
against the declarant's interest was the disgrace he would incur 
upon becoming an informant. The trial court allowed the attorney 
to testify only about the declarant's admissions that he 
was involved in the robbery but not about the participation of 
others. This was upheld on appeal becuase the indicia of trust-
worthiness of the statement was found in the fact that it was 
made against the declarant's penal interest; however, the court 
found that it was not against the declarant's penal interest to 
name the other participants in the robbery. 
There is no question in the case at bar that the statement 
-13-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
made by the appellant subjected him to criminal liability 
at least to the offense of Criminal Trespass. This meets one of 
the criteria of Rule 63(10) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
that at the time the assertion was made it was contrary for 
the declarant' s criminal liability. Another criterion is that 
under the circumstances the declaration IM)uld not have been 
made unless the declarant believed it to be true. The state-
ment was made a matter of minutes after leaving the resort, 
under the emotional stress of the appellant's arrest. The appel-
lant also admitted to being in Mr. Ball's room, thus corroborat· 
ing his identification of the appellant. These circumstances 
provide sufficient indicia of reliability to establish the appel· 
lant' s belief that the declaration was true for purposes of this 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
The final criterion for admissibility is that the declar-
ant was unavailable. The appellant in this case was unavailable 
for several reasons. First of all, the appellant, like any 
criminal defendant, was protected by the privilege against self· 
incrimination as provided by the Constitutions of the State of 
Utah and the United States. Rule 62(7) (a) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence includes exception of a witness on the grounds of 
privilege as a situation constituting unavailability. Further· 
more, the appellant refused to testify because he would have to 
answer to his prior felony convictions for burglary. The trial 
court ruled that he could not consider the admissibility of prior 
-14-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
felony convictions in light of Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence (T.50-51). That rule allows the trial court to 
weigh the probative value of evidence against the prejudicial 
effect of that evidence: 
Except as in these rules otherwise provided 
the judge may in his discretion exclude eviden~e 
if he finds that its probative vlaue is sub-
stantially outweighed by the risk that its 
admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption 
of time, or (b) create substantial danger of 
undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of 
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and 
harmfully surprise a party who has not had 
reasonable opportunity to anticipate that 
such evidence would be offered. 
This ruling is clearly incorrect in light of this court's holding 
in State v. Roberts, 612 P.2d 360 (Utah, 1980). Because 
of the prejudicial nature of these prior convictions the 
appellant was forced to assert his constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination, thus making him unavailable. Con-
sequently, the appellant's statement was admissible as a declaration 
against interest as described in Rule 63 (10) of tt>e Utah Rules 
of Evidence, and the trial court corranitted error by excluding 
that evidence. 
POINT E 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY EXCLUDING 
THE APPELLAJ.~T'S HEARSAY STATEMENT AS IT WAS A 
CONTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT. 
The statement given by the appellant was made a matter of 
minutes after he left Mr. Ball's room, upon being stopped by the 
police, while he was under the stress and pressure of a felony arest. 
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Even though such a statement is hearsay, it qualifies as an 
exception to the hearsay rule because it is a contemporaneous 
statement as described in Rule 63(4)(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. That rule provides: 
A statement (a) which the judge finds was made 
while the declarant was perceiving the event 
or condition which the statement narrates, 
describes or explains, or (b) which the 
judge finds was made while the declarant was 
under the stress of a nervous excitement 
caused by such perception. 
The portion of this rule which is applicable to this case is 
part "(b)" which requires that the declarant still be under 
the stress or nervous excitement caused by the perception. 
In State v. Sanders, supra, the court found that such stress 
or nervous excitement was not present when one of the co-defend-
ants was recovering property from a snowbank which was 
taken in a robbery. The declarant made a statement to the 
witness implicating himself and three others in the robbery. 
Apparently, this act was done some time after the actual commis-
sion of the robbery and the trial court had found that the 
stress of nervous excitement was not present. In contrast, the 
statement of the victim of a forcible sodomy and forcit>le sexual 
abuse which was made a matter of minutes after the offense 
occured to an adult neighbor was held to be admissible in 
State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah, 1978). The court quoted 
Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wash. 2d 398, 457 P.2d 194 (1969), to 
describe the nature of this exception to the hearsay rule, 
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The crucial question in all cases is 
whether the statement was made while the 
declarant was still under the influence 
of the event to the extent that his state-
ment could not be the result of fabrication 
intervening actions, or the exercise of ' 
choice or judgment. State v. McMillan, 
supra, at 163. 
The court went on to find that a child making a statement a 
matter of minutes after an occurance of a sex offense would 
have little likelihood of fabricating the statement. 
As previously noted the statement in this case was made by 
the appellant a matter of minutes after the event occurred. 
Although he was an adult, the statement was made upon arrest under 
the stress and nervous excitement of that sort of traumatic 
event. With respect to the time frame, the pressure and considering 
who the statement was made to, State v. Sanders, supra, is 
easily distinguishable. However, the facts here are very close 
to those of State v. ~1cMillan, supra. This is because the state-
ment was made a very short time after the event occurred. It 
was made to a person in authority, the mother of a neighbor in 
acMillan and a police officer here. It also was made while the 
declarant was still unquestionably under the stress of nervous 
excitement from the incident. Consequently, the appellant's 
hearsay statement was admissible as a contemporaneous statement 
as described in Rule 63 (4) (b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence and 
the trial court committed error in excluding it. 
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POINT F 
THE ERROR IN EXCLUDING THE APPELLAi.~T'S 
HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS PREJUDICIAL BECAUSE 
THERE IS A REASONABLE PROBABILITY THAT 
THE VERDICT WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT HAD 
THE EVIDENCE BEEN ADMITTED. 
To gain a reversal of a verdict based on the erroneous 
exclusion of evidence two things must be shown, as described in 
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence: 
A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, 
nor shall the judgment or decision based thereon 
be reversed, by reason of the erroneous exclusion 
of evidence unless (a) it appears of record that the 
proponent of the evidence either made known the sub-
stance of the evidence in a form and by a method 
approved by the judge, or indicated the substance of 
the expected evidence by questions indicating the 
desired answers, and (b) tr.e Court which passes upon 
the effect of the error or errors is of the opinion 
that the excluded evidence would probably have had a 
substantial influence in bringing about a dif-
ferent verdict or finding. 
The substance of the evidence in question was made known by way 
of a proffer out of the jury's presence (T. 44, 49). A 
lenghthy discussion on the admissibility of the evidence was 
had between court and counsel prior to the trial court's ruling 
(T. 41-45, 49-50). The question was properly raised below 
and the first criterionfor reversal has been fulfilled. 
It must now be shown that the excluded evidence would have 
had a substantial influence in bringing about a different ver-
di~t. In· State v. Simmons, supra, where error was found, but 
held to not be prejudicial, this requirement was described to 
mean that "There must be a reasonable probability there would 
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have been a result more favorable to the defendant in the 
absence of error" Id. at 343. In this case the hearsay state-
ment was the only direct evidence of the appellant's intent in 
entering Mr. Ball's room. As previously described he was 
precluded from testifying in his own behalf by the trial court's 
ruling on the admissibility of the appellant's prior felony 
convictions. Even if the appellant had testified, this evidence, 
introduced from the state's witness, would have corroborated his 
testimony and bolstered his credibility. The only factual issue 
in the trial was the appellant's intent in entering into the 
room. In the absence of any other direct evidence on the issue 
of the appellant's intent the erroneous exclusion of this 
statement creates a reasonalbe probability that he verdict would 
have been different. This is because the jury would then have 
heard the appellant's explanation for his presence in the room, 
other than the equivocal statement to Mr. Ball that he was 
looking for a way out. The judgment of the district court should 
be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. 
POINT II 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF THE CRIME OF BURGLARY A..~D THE FAILURE OF THE 
COURT TO SO INSTRUCT WHEN REQUESTED BY APPELLAJ.~T 
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Criminal Trespass is a necessarily included offense of 
Burglary; consequently the court's failure to instruct the jury 
on Criminal Trespass constituted prejudicial error and the appel-
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lant' s conviction for Burglary should be reversed and a new tria'. 
granted. 
The appellant requested that the trial court instruct 
the jury on Criminal Trespass as a lesser included offense to 
Burglary (R. 25,27). 
In appellant's requested Instruction No. 7 the appellant 
requested an instruction on the offense of Criminal Trespass, 
a Class B Misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2)(a) 
(1953 as amended). This requested instruction provided: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
Before you can convict the defendant, ALFRED WILLIAM 
JOHNSON, of the crime of Criminal Trespass, a Class 
B Misdemeanor, a lesser included offense of burglary 
as charged in the Information, you must find from 
the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, every 
one of the following essential elements of that 
crime: 
1. That on or about the 25th day of May, 1979, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, 
ALFRED WILLI&'1 JOHNSON, under circumstances not 
amounting to burglary as defined in these 
instructions, entered the dwelling of Richard Ball 
2. That the defendant, ALFRED WILLIAM JOHNSON, 
entered or remained unlawfully on said property; and 
(a) Intended to cause annoyance or injury to any 
person thereon or damage to any property thereon; or 
(b) Intended to commit any crime, other than theft 
or a felony; or 
(c) Was reckless .as to whether his presence would 
cause fear for the safety of another. 
The trial court refused to submit the requested Instruction 
7 on the lesser included offense of Criminal Trespass to the jurv 
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and appellant took proper exception to the court's failure to 
instruct on the lesser included offense 1 (T. 74, 75). 
POINT A 
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A RIGHT 
TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE 
JURY IN THE INSTRUCTIONS 
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that an 
accused in a criminal action has a right to submit to the jury 
his theory of the case, and that such theory when properly 
requested should be given to the jury in the form of written 
instructions. State v. Stenback, 78 U.350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931). 
In Utah this right allows for the presentation of instructions 
on all defenses and theories, including lesser included offenses, 
when such are properly requested by the accused. State v. 
Gillian, 23 Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson, 
560 P. 2d 1120 (Utah 1977). 
An accused may make the decision as a matter of trial 
strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request instructions 
on a lesser included offense if his theory of defense so dictates. 
1. Counsel for appellant requested the Instruction in writing 
and took exception to the trial court's failure to give the 
request to the jury, properly preserving this issue on . 
aopeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51. State v. Erickson, 
563 P.Zd 750 ( Utah 1977); State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977); 
and State v. Gleason, 17 U.2d l.~9. 405 P.2d 793 (1965). Accord: 
Rules of Practice in the District Courts, Rule 5.4. 
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State v. Mora, 558 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah 1977); State v. 
Gellaty, 22 U.2d 149, 152, 449 P.2d 993 (1969); State v. 
Valdez, 19 U.2d 426, 428, 432 P.2d 53 (1967); State v. 
Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955). However, when the 
accused as his theory of the case requests instructions on 
lesser included offenses and is willing to submit his guilt 
or innocence to the jury on that theory, the trial court as 
a general rule is duty bound to submit these alternatives to 
the trier of the fact. State v. Gillian, 23 U.2d 372, 375, 
463 P.2d 811 (1970). 
When the theory of defense embraces an argument, in effect 
in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime as charged 
in the Information but some lesser offense the teachings of 
Gillian yet apply. On this point the Gillian court stated: 
One of the fundamental principles to the 
submission of issues to juries is that where 
the parties so request they are entitled to 
have instruction given on their theory of 
the case; and this includes on lesser offenses 
if any reasonable view of the evidence would 
support such a verdict. (State v. Gillian, supra, 
23 U.2d at 374). 
In Gillian, this court pointed out the reasons for this 
rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness of such a 
rule. This court said it should not be the prerogative of the 
trial court to direct the jury as to what degree of crime they 
may find a defendant guilty or to direct them that they must 
find him not guilty if they do not find him guilty of the greater 
offense. To allow this permits the court to be a judge of the 
facts and to in effect direct a verdict on the lesser included 
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offenses. Such a procedure violates the historical spirit 
3.S well as letter of our system of jury trial under the Sixth 
g_nd Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution of 
Utah. State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 P. 55 (1929) 
(Straup, J. concurring). See also Beck v. Alabama, 
U.S. 65 LEd 2d 392 (1980). 
POINT B 
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS A LESSER AND INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF BURGLARY 
The test most recently given to determine if one offense 
is a lesser included offense of another is that found in the 
recently revised Utah Criminal Code. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(3) 
(1953 asamended) provides in pertinent part: 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense charged but may not be convicted 
of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish the 
commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) If constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, 
or form of preparation to commit the offense charged or 
an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically desigRated by a statute 
as a lesser included offense.2 
The process by which such a determination is made was described in 
2. This statute was recently interpreted in State v. Lloyd, . 
568 P.2d 357 (Utah 1977) and its companion case, State v. Corm.sh 
568 P. 2d 360 ('Jtah 1977) wherein this court held that the Utah 
joyriding statute is a lesser included offense of theft of an 
operable motor vehicle. 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 (1934): 
The only way this matter may be determined is by 
discovering all of the elements required by the 
respective sections, comparing them and by a 
process of inclusion and exclusion, determine 
those common and those not common, and, if the 
greater offense includes all legal and factual 
elements, it may safely be said that the great 
includes the less, if, however, the lesser 
offense requires the inclusion of some necessary 
element or elements in order to cover the completed 
offense, not so included in the greater 
offense, then it may be safely said that the 
lesser is not necessarily included in the great. (33 
P.2d at 645) 
The elements which must be proved to constitute the 
crime of Burglary as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202 
(1953 as amended) are: 
(1) A person must enter or remain in a building 
or portion of a building; 
(2) The entry or presence is unlawful; 
(3) The actor must possess the intent to 
cornrnit a felony, theft or assault. 
There are two distinct offenses which constitute the crime 
of Criminal Trespass as described in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206 
(1953 as amended). The elements of the first type of Criminal 
Trespass as defined in Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as 
amended) are: 
(1) A person enters or remains on property; 
(2) The entry or presence if unlawful; 
(3) The actor possesses the intent to cause 
annoyance, or cornrnit a crime other than a theft 
or a felony or the actor is reckless as to whether . 
his presence will cause fear for the safety or another 
3. This was the character of the Criminal Trespass instruction 
requested in appellant's proposed Instruction. 
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The elements of the second type of Criminal Trespass are: 
(1) AThpeerson enters or remains on property; 
(2) person knows his presence is unlawful· 
(3) Notice against entry has been given by ' 
personal communication or by a tence or 
enclosure, or by posting signs. 
In comparing the statutes as Hoolman advises the first 
thin;; to ask is "can a Burglary be committed without commit-
ing the offense of Criminal Trespass?" If the answer is "no" 
to commit a Burglary one must perforce commit a Criminal 
:respass, then Criminal Trespass is a lesser included offense 
of Burglary. State v. Woolman, supra, 84 U. at 35. An important 
point of note is the provision of the Criminal Trespass 
Statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-206(2) (1953 as amended), which 
states: 
A person is guilty of criminal trespass if, 
under circumstances not amounting to burglary 
as defined in sections 76-6-202, 76-2-203, 
76-2-204: ... [Emphasis Suppled] 
The importance of this provision is that criminal trespass 
requires proof of the same elements as are needed to prove the 
elements of the crime of burglary. In other words, criminal 
trespass is established by proof of less than all of the 
facts required to establish the commission of burglary. Obviously 
4. This type of Criminal Trespass was not requested by appellant. 
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• 
the legislative intent in this series of statutes is to make 
criminal trespass a lesser included offense to the burglary 
statutes. The elements of trespass and the burglary statutes 
. d . 1 5 are l. entica . Both require one to enter or remain in a 
building and both require that such entry or presence be unlaw-
ful. The difference in the statutes is that burglary requires 
a more specific intent than criminal trespass. In State v. 
Sunter, 550 P.2d 184 (Utah 1977), this court held that possessic: 
of burglary tools, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-204 (1953 as amended), 
is not an included offense in the burglary statutes. This 
court went on to state that for an offense to be included in 
the greater offense of burglary, it must be embraced with the 
Jegal definition of burglary, and that the gist of the offense 
of burglary is the unlawful entry into a building unlike poss-
ession of burglary tools which is a possessory offense. 
In State v. Hendricks, 596 P. 2d 633 (Utah 1979), the defenda: 
charged with burglary raised the defense of volunatry intoxicatic· 
and requested an instruction on criminal trespass which was 
denied. On appeal the defendant claimed error in the failure to 
give the instruction, but this court ruled that the defendant's 
lack of intent was inconsistent with a request for an instructioc 
5. The legislature placed the burglary and criminal trespass 
statutes in the same part of the code, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 
et. seq. (1953 as amended), and provided common definitions 
for both burglary and criminal trespass in Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-201 (1953 as amended). 
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on the lesser offense. Although the court did not expressly 
state that criminal trespass is an included offense to the charge 
of burglary, that holding seems implicit in the court's 
ruling that "the evidence (including that presented by 
the defendant) establishes all of the elements of burglary 
but did not establish all of the elements of criminal 
trespass" Ibid at 634. 
The statutory history of the burglary and trespass sections 
of the Utah Criminal Code also reflect the fact that trespass 
is a lesser included offense of burglary. Both provisions 
are derived from the Texa~; Penal Code. 6 In Day v. State, 
532 S.W. 2d 302 (Tex. 1976), the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals held that a criminal trespass offense was a lesser 
included offense to its burglary statute. The Texas Court said: 
As can be seen, the first three elements of 
each of the three types of burglary and 
criminal trespass are virtually identical. 
The fourth main element of burglary, either the 
specific intent to commit or the actual cormuission 
or attempted commission of a felony or theft, 
depending on the type of burglary involved, 
is absent from the offense of criminal trespass. 
(532 S.W. 2d at 306). 
In similar circumstances wherein the prosecution was for 
attempted burglary, the New Yoi:kCourt of Appeals also found the 
6. Jay Barney, Utah Criminal Code Outline (1973). The Texas 
Code provisions are in turn taken from the Model Penal Code 
Provision. See A.L.I. Model Penal Code (P.O:D. 1962) §§221.0, 
221. 2 
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failure of the trail court to instruct on the lesser included 
offense of criminal tresspass reversible error. In People v 
Henderson, 41 NY. 2d 233, 359 N.E. 2d 1357 (1976) the court 
reversing the attempted burglary conviction noted: 
The test of whether a "lesser included offense" 
is to be submitted is certainly not that it is 
probable that the crime was actually 
cormnitted or even that there is substantial 
evidence to support such a view. It suffices 
that it is supportable on a rational basis or, 
put another way, by logical necessity. To warrant 
a refusal to submit it "every possible hypothesis" 
but guilt of the higher crime must be excluded, 
[citations omitted], the evidence for that 
purpose being required to be considered in the 
light most favorable to the defendant 
(People v. Battle, 22 N.Y. 2d 323, 292 N.Y.S. 
2d 661, 239 N.E. 2d 535) since the jury is 
free to accept or reject part or all of the 
defense or prosecution's evidence [citations 
omitted] . 
The court's appraisal of the persuasiveness 
of the evidence indicating guilt of the higher 
count is irrelevant; the question simply is 
whether on any reasonable view of the evidence 
it is possible for the trier of the facts to acquit 
the defendant on the higher count [citations 
omitted] and still find him guilty on the lesser 
one. And it may not be amiss to observe that, 
at time, in their projection of laymen's sensi-
tivities to facts, "juries may, on almost any ex~us~, 
convict of a lower degree of crime although conviction 
of a higher degree is clearly warranted" [citations 
omitted] 
So tested, it must be concluded that, while on 
the evidence here, though Henderson did not gain 
entrance to the building (hence the charge of 
attempted burg1ary) and fled when surprised 
by owner, the jury nevertheless could have 
found an intent to commit a larceny based upon 
circumstantial evidence (see Peozle v. Terr~, 
43 A.D. 2d 875, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 18 ), it coul also 
have found that he lacked the requisite intent at the 
time he broke the window [citations omitted] . · · 
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the jury could have decided that he never intended 
to corrnnit a larceny, but rather was motivated by any 
one of a conceivable number of other purposes such as 
for exa~pl~, an in~ent to bed down in the premises, 
to obtain information, or to engage in an act 
of mischeif not larcenous in nature - all 
purposes, incidently, only somewhat less rational 
than the one the People had asked the jury to infer 
from the circumstantial evidence in view of the 
fact that there was in this case no direct or cer-
tain proof of the defendant's actual purpose. 
(359 N.E. 2d at 1360) 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also held criminal 
trespass to be a leser included offense of burglary in 
construing statutes akin to those found in Utah. Common-
7 
wealth v. Carter, 344 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1975). 
Undeniably, criminal trespass, as described in Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-206 (1953 as amended) is a lesser included offense 
to the burglary provisions of the Utah Criminal Code, Utah 
Code Ann. §§76-6-202, 76-6-203, 76-6-204 (1953 as amended). 
POINT C 
WHEN MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES. 
Because criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of 
burglary under Utah's statutes, the issue that now-must be 
addressed is "when must the trial court instruct the jury on 
such a lesser included offense?" 
7. Pennsylvania's statutes like Utah's appear to be a result 
of the Model Penal Code. Accord: State v. Coffin, 565 
P.2d 391 (Ore. 1977). 
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The issue raised in the instant case has been before this 
court on numerous occasions in the past and has, on occasion, 
brought differing views from the members of this court. 
The need that such an instruction be given has been ruled 
to be a statuttory requirement. The statute in force at the t~ 
of the appellant's trial is found in Utah Code Ann. §77-33-6 
(1953 as amended), which states: 
The jury may find the defendant guilty of any offense 
the commission of which is necessarily included 
in that with which he is charged in the indictment 
or information, or of an attempt to commit the 
offense. 
This provision was expounded upon by the legislature in 
the 1973 Criminal Code Revision in §76-1-402(4) which 
provides: 
The court shall not be obligated to charge 
the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis 
for a verdict acquitting the defendant of 
the offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. [Emphasis Supplied] 
The foregoing provision, as this court has noted, 
codifies prior existing common law principles dating back 
to territorial times in Utah. People v. Robinson, 6 U. 101, 
21 P.403 (1889); State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978). 
In State v. Barkas, 91 Utah 5 74, 65 P. 2d 1130 (1937), 
this court noted that the failure to give an instruction 
on lesser included offenses when requested . . clashes 
with two fundamental rules of trial in criminal cases: It 
has the effect of the court weighing the evidence and, in effec: 
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limiting the jury to a consideration of only part of the evi-
dence (the defendants'): and it, in effect, casts upon 
the accused the burden of proving his innocence or justification." 
(65 P.2d at 1132). 
When the accused requests a lesser included instruction 
there should exist a presumption that the requested instruction 
8 be given. Such is the tenor of this court's discussions 
in the past. In State v. Hymas, 64 U.285, 230 P. 349 (1924)' 
it was stated: 
It is, however, always a delicate matter for 
a trial court to withhold from the ju~y the 
right to find the accused guilty of a 
lesser or included offense, and determine 
the question of the state of the evidence 
as matter of law. That should be done only 
in very clear cases. (64 U.2 at 287) Accord: 
State v. Barkas, 91 U.574, 580, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937). 
8. This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v. 
Gillian supra, 23 U.2d at 376 wherein it is said: 
The usual rule on an appeal in which 
the challenge is to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the verdict, 
is that we review the record in the light 
favorable to the jury's verdict. However, 
in this situation where the question 
raised relates to the refusal to submit 
included offenses, it is our duty to survey 
the whole evidence and the inferences 
naturally to be deduced therefrom t~ see 
whether there is any reasonable basis 
therein which would support a conviction 
of the lesser offenses. 
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In recent years this court has endeavored to set specific 
guidelines providing for the submission of lesser included 
offense when requested. 
The statutory necessity of instructing a jury on a 
lesser includeci offense was described in State v. Dougherty, 
550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976). This court cited Lisby v. State, 
83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966), which followed provision 
similar to Utah Code Ann. §77-33-6 (1953). Describing the 
holdi~g of the Nevada Court this courtsaid: 
The Court discussed three situations in which 
the problem of lesser included offenses are 
frequently encountered. First, where there 
is evidence which would absolve the defendant 
from guilt of a greater offense, or degree, but 
would support a finding of guilt of a lesser 
offense, or degree; the instruction is man-
datory. 
Second, where the evidence would not support 
a finding of guilt in the commission of the lesser 
offense or degree. For example, the defendant 
denies any complicity in the crime charged, 
and thus lays no foundation for any inter-
mediate verdict; or where the elements of the 
offenses differ, and some element essential to the 
lesser offense is either not proved or shown 
not to exist. This second situation renders an 
instruction on a lesser included offense 
erroneous, because it is not pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where 
the elements of the greater offense include all eleme· 
of the lesser offense; because, by its very 
nature, the greater offense could not have been 
committed without defendant having the intent 
in doing the acts which constitute the lesser 
included offense.' In such a situation instructions 
on the lesser included offense may be given, be-
cause all elements of the lesser offense have : 
been given. However, such an instruction may proper· 
be refused if the prosecution has met its burden 
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of proof on the greater offense, and there is 
no evidence tending to reduce the greater offense. 
The court concluded by stating that if there be 
any evidence, however slight, on any reasonable 
theory of the case under which the defendant 
might be convicted of a lesser included 
offense, the court must, if requested, give 9 
an appropriate instruction. (550 P.2d at 176-177) 
The question that arises then when lesser included 
instructions are requested is: was there " . any evidence, 
however slight, on any reasonable theory under which the 
defendant might be convicted of the lesser tand] included 
offense. of criminal trespass. State v. Dougherty, 
supra, at 177; State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1977) 
(Justice Wilkins, concurring). If there was such evidence 
then the instructions were properly requested and should have 
been submitted to the jury for consideration. 
In State v. Hendricks,596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), a 
criminal trespass instruction was refused when the defendant 
was charged with burglary and that ruling was upheld on appeal 
because the court found that the evidence did not warrant 
the instruction. The defendant had raised the defense of 
voluntary intoxication and testified that he entered the 
building to search for friends. He was found hiding in a 
closet and typewriters had been moved to the point of entry. 
9. State v. Doughert5, supra, has been followed in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 133 , 1355 (Utah 1977), and State v. 
Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1977). 
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In this case the appellant admitted that he was 
present in Mr. Ball's apartment at Snowbird (T. 38-39). He 
was also identified by Mr. Ball as the individual who was 
observed in the apartment (T. 19). Mr. Ball had not given 
the appellant authority to enter the apartment (T. 19), and 
entry was apparently gained by cut ting the screen to a s lidir.; 
door (T. 12). The only evidence that could conceivably 
explain the appellant's presence was that a wooden box had 
been moved from a shelf at the head of the bed to the 
center of Mr. Ball's waterbed (T. 18) and the statement 
made by the appellant to Mr. Ball when Mr. Ball questioned 
him about his presence. The appellant stated that he was 
"looking for a way out" and that he was staying upstairs 
(T. 12-13). The box, however, had not been opened and the 
appellant did not have any property in his hands, nor was any 
property missing. Under these facts a reasonable theory was 
that the appellant had entered the apartment for some reason 
other than to commit a theft. 
Appellant's actions in the instant case are similar 
to those of the accused in Crawford v. State, 241 N .E. 2d 
795 (Indiana 1968). In Crawford the accused was found 
hiding inside a building at an unusual hour. The Indiana 
Court in reversing his conviction for burglary noted that his 
denial of intent to commit a theft was sufficient to raise an 
issue as to such intent (241 N .E. 2d at 797). Moreover, withe 
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further evidence his mere unauthorized entry10 into the building 
containing articles which could easily be carried away was 
insufficient in and of itself to prove the intent to 
steal those articles. (241 N .E. 2d at 798, DeBruler, 
Judge concurring). 
Several cases involving similar facts have required 
that the charge of burglary be reduced to criminal tres-
pass. In State v. Rood, 462 P.2d 399 (Ariz. 1969), the defend-
ant was seen inside of a building with his hand on a 
television set. When the neighbor came to investigate the 
defendant fled. The court held that the State must prove 
that the defendant had the intent to commit a specific crime 
to sustain the charge of burglary and not just the intent to 
do some undetermined thing at the time he was inside of the 
builiing. Similarly, in State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 646, 
500 P.2d 747 (Haw. 1972), the defendant was found in the 
victim's hotel room, when asked what he was doing there the 
defendant stated that it was his room and he then fled from the 
hotel. The court held that the mere fact that the entry was 
forced or unlawful did not establish the requisite intent for 
10. It has long been the rule in Utah that me~e pres~nce 
where a crime is being committed is in and of itself insuf-
ficient upon which to base a conviction. State v. Helm, 
563 P.2d 794, 797 (~tah 1977); State v. Gee, 28 U.Zd 96, 498 
P.2d 662 (1972); and State v. Fertig, 120 U. 224, 233 P.2d 
347 (1951). 
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burglary. The court then held that the evidence was insuf-
ficient to establish a prima facie case for burglary and the 
charge should be reduced to criminal trespass. 
When a court has erred by failing to give a requested 
instruction the error is deemed to be prejudicial 
"if the requested instruction had been given and the jury had 
so considered the evidence, there is reasonable likelihood 
that it may have some effect on the verdict rendered." 
State v. ~itcheson, 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977). The 
evidence offered in this case on the issue of intent was 
all circumstantial. It is quite reasonable for the jury 
to infer from this evidence that the appellant had some 
intent other than to commit a theft when he entered the apartsr 
This is especially true when this court considers the holding 
of the courts in State v. Rood, supra, and State v. Kahinu, 
supra. In light of those holdings there is not only a reason-
able likelihood that the verdict would have been dif-
ferent had the jury been properly instructed, but that outcome 
would have been a distinct possibility. This is because the 
jury would not have to be asked to acquit t,te appellant r,•ho 
was in :rr. Ball's apartment without permission to be there, 
they could have found that he was guilty of the lesser 
offense. 
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CONCLUSION 
The only element of the offense of burglary which 
was at issue in the trial was the appellant's intent to 
commit a theft. The court committed prejudicial error by 
refusing to allow counsel to question the arresting 
officer about the appellant's hearsay statement in which 
he denied that he had requisite intent. This statement 
was admissible under at least five of the exceptions to 
the hearsay rule. Likewise, the trial court committed 
prejudicial error by refusing to instruct the jury on the 
lesser and included offense of trespass. Th~s 
is because the only difference between burglary and criminal 
trespass is the intent to conunit a theft. 
DATED this ~~day of October, 1980. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
